THE SECOND UPRIGHTING ATTEMPT - SUMMER 1983
MAIN CONTRACTORS PERFORMANCE
(added Nov. 2002)

1.0 General
End of March 1983 Stolt Nielsen Seaway Contracting A/S (SNSC) was elected the successful bidder for the second uprighting attempt of the capsized Alexander L. Kielland platform. Uprighting to be performed in the Gandsfjord outside Stavanger. SNSC had been involved in "Kielland" since the D-leg was towed into Stavanger, and inspection performed by the Official Investigation Committee primo April 1980. It was divers from Stolt Nielsen who during the night cut of the below water situated breaking parts of bracing D4 lower breaking point, and bracing DE breaking point for transportation to Statoil's laboratory. The operation was supervised by Stolt Nielsen's man in charge, Trygve Westin.

Ater the first uprighting attempt had failed in fall 1980 pressure was put on the governing Labour Party to prepare for a new attempt. Several politicians including members of the Labour Party advocated for sinking the platform, however, pressure applied from the relatives and survivors organization and others, made it impossible for the Government to sink the platform without making another attempt. Kværner Engineering became involved in the planning of the next operation. Stolt Nielsen was again contracted to make underwater survey of the capsized rig for recording data as input to the planners, and preparation for a new attempt to take place.

The firsts attempt in fall 1980 was stopped by the Government. The said reason was that the risk for human injuries was to high to continue the operation. The operation was performed by SD-Marine headed up by Alan Whittaker. When Scot Kobus as operations manager decided to pull in crane barges to increase the uprighting momentum, the operation was stopped. The technical reason for having to increase the turning force must have been due to loss of buoyancy from the rig itself. As the uprighting proceeded and the deck of the platform started to break the water surface big bubbels of air captured inside the rig escaped, making the rig fall back into the water. The airbags attached to the rig proved not to have the required uprigthing capacity. Although they started to leak this was compensated by pumping more air into the bags. The rig was from a maritime point correctly turned backwords i.e. making trapped water to escape through the same openings it possible had entered into the rig during capsizing. However, the loss of trapped air caused loss of buoyancy, and the weight of the submerged platform increased above the required turning capacity from the airbags. When the operation was stopped and the rig brought back to its capsized position it was likely still a great amount of trapped air left in the rig and deck. The amount of air is, however, hard to assess as air get compressed with increasing waterdepth. A further indication of trapped air and free surface area in different places in the rig, was that the result of the inclination test performed in fall 1982 to determine center of gravity was not satisfactory.

To understand the above technicalities you - being an aeronautical engineer - just had to follow the day to day press reports from the operation.

In accordance with Kværner Engineerings Main Schedule for performance of the uprighting, letter of intent to Uprighting Main Contractor should be issued in end of March 1983. There were 3 bidders, Neptun from Sweden, Smith International from Holland, and Stolt Nielsen from Norway, the latter becomming the succesful bidder. Stolt Nielsen had planned to use the Scothsman Bill Forsythe as their Project and Operations manager. Forsythe was hired by Stolt Nielsen for their contract on Preparatory works leading up to the uprighting.

Due to political pressure to have a Norwegian Project Operations Manager, Stolt Nielsen contracted Ole Ostlund for the uprighting project. Mr. Ostlund's name was presented in Stolt Nielsens bid for the works. He in person was brought in on the job when it became obvious that Stolt Nielsen would become the succesful bidder. Visiting Stolt Nielsen's offices in Oslo a few days before letter of intent Mr. Ostlund was handed over a copy of the tender documents including articles of agreement, Scope of Work, the project organization chart and contractors main progress schedule. Thus beeing his instruction for starting his work as Main Contractors Representative i.e. Project Operations Manager.

2.0 Status at Contract Award
2.1 Quality Assurance
Tender Documents Part-1, Section IV- Form of Tender, Form 4: Methods - Organization, item 6.11 Quality Assurance: qoute,
"Tendering Contractor shall demonstrate that the requirements set out in NS 5801, Requirements for the Contractor,s Quality Assurance" - "Quality Assurance System", can be complied with." ,unqoute, ref; Tender - Quality Assurance

In other words the tender requires Contractor to comply with NS 5801 (Norwegian Standard NS 5801 of 1981 is basicly compatible with todays International Standard ISO 9001).

The Tender also requires Contractor to demonstrate that the requirements set out in NS 5801 can be complied with. To demonstrate such cmpliance Company by its Company Representative, Kværner Engineering, should have done a precontract award qualification audit of SNSC Quality Assurance system and implimentation of such. It must have shown obvious to anyone with QS qualifications that SNSC' at the time of contract award, did not have an operational Quality Assurance system satisfying the requirements of NS 5801. As such Kværner Engiennering as Company Representative could not have performed any trustworthy audit.

Tender Documents Part 2, Conditions of Contract , Scope of Work, page 28, clause 9.11. Certifying Agent and Independent Controlling Authority states, quote:
"Det norske Veritas is appointed as Certifying Agent andIndependent Controlling Authority for the Work. Their work will comprise:
- Evaluation and checking of all calculations, procedures and drawings.
- Establishment of safety philosophy and safety margin.
- Construction supervision and certification of equipment
- Control and inspection during all physical work, including Towing and Uprighting Operations.

Main Contractor shall obtain approval of all his calculations, procedures and drawings from Det norske Veritas through Project Manager prior to the commencement of the relevant Work Items.", unqoute.

2.2. Contract Responsibilities.
Tender documents, Part 2, Section I, Contract, Article 2 - Contract Documents lists all documunets comprising the Contract at date of Award.Article 2 - Contract Documents

Article 2.3 further lists the importance of the various documents, quote;
"In the event of any conflicts between the Contract Documents, the provisions of the Article of Agreement shall prevail, and the Annexes shall take precedence in the following order:
1) Annex A: Scope of Work
2) Annex B: Scheduls of Rates and Prices, Work Budget and Schedule of Payment
3) Annex D: Secrecy Agreement
4) Annex C: Programme of Work
5) Annex E: Technical Documents. In general unless otherwise instructed, Specifications take precedence before Drawings.
6) Annex F: Coordination Procedures.

As such the Article of Agreement is ruling above Scope of Work, and third comes Cost (i.e. Prices, Budget, Payment). Of less importance is Coordination procedures.

Scope of Work, clause 1.2 specifies Mangement and Responsibilities
Clause 1.2b gives Main Contractor full and undivided authority and responsibility for the management of the operation. He shal report to Project Manager any unforeseen or irregular event or development of the operations and propose corrective actions.

Scope of Work, Clause 1.2c, quote;
"In the case of sudden, unforeseen or irregular events or development that require immediate action, the Main Contractor's Representative shall take such actions that he judges is best to safeguard personnel. vesels and equipment and to secure the successful result of the operation."unquote.(contnd. clause 1.2c)

Scope of Work Clause 1.2 gives Main Contractor's Representaitive undivided authority and responsibility in the case of events that require immediate action to secure the successful result of the operation.

What may comprise such a critical event?
Technical:
- too small buoyancy tanks, causing lack of uprighting momentum in the critical part of the uprighting.
- failure in anchoring system?
Safety:
- lack of buoyancy to comply with the Safety Requirement of at least 900 tons damage stability during the critical phase of the uprighting?
Ecconomics:
- expenditure far above budget. At the time of contract awward statements were made that no additional fundings would be granted by Parliament.
Timing:
- uprighting at contract award was scheduled to July 21st. Given weather window for safety reasons was up til September 15th.

Main Contractor's Representative Mr. Ole Ostlund regarded technical and safety matters to be most critical for a sucessful result at the time of contract award. If the buoyancy tanks delivered by Kværner proved to be to small during the most critical part of the operation this would most likey jeopordize a successful result, the operation would be stopped. At the time of contract award there was not discussion of reducing the set requirement of 900 tons damage stability. Further the rig was this time going to be turned 360 degrees which meant that trapped air would escape earlier from the deck and the deck catch water. Drawings showed the deck to be lifted up of the water above the initial uprighting concept. This could be critical as trapped water in the deck would increase the weight when lifting the deck out of the water unless adequate drainage were planned for and openings cut prior to uprighting.

2.3 Design review - approval.
Contract Document specified the Work to be carried out in accordance with Norwegian Standard NS 5801 for Quality Assurance.

NS 5801 Section 6; Development and design, ref. Comments, quote:
"Design review may be performed at different stages of the development and design phase to ensure that technical features, such as functional requirements, environmental requirements, safety requirements and requirements as to suitability for production, use and service, are met.
All instances which shall work on the basis of documentation resulting from development and design should normally participate in the design review. Design documents released for production shall be approved, and may only be changed in accordance with stated procedures, (see clause 5).", unquote.

NS 5801 calls for Design Reviews as well as Approvals.
- Technical documentation shall be checked by personnel who do not have direct responsibility for preparation of this document.
- Approvals to be obtained by DnV as Certifying Authority through Company Representative.
- Design documents released for production shall be approved.

The main questioned to be answered before taking on a lot of expenditures related to floating equipment was: STATUS ON DNV APPROVAL
Next to plan for corrective actions if status on the approval required such action to be taken. In order to make corrective plans for Project Manager's approval, some cost had to be spent on personnel performing such task.

2.4 Restrains - Critical items
2.4.1 Ecconomics
Contract Award, i.e. Letterof Intent of April 30th was based upon the Parliaments approval of the financing of the uprighting. The matter of approval would be dealt with by the Parliament on April 14th 1980. Until the Parliament had approved the expenditure Main Contractor was instructed by Project Manager (KE) to keep expenditures within max 3 mill Nkr in case the Parliament did not grant the required money 140 mill Nkr to cover the entire operation including the cost for construction of buoyancy tanks and others involved. The budgeted cost for the uprighting contractor was approx 70 mill Nkr at the time. The limit of Nkr 3mill kr put a restraint on the start up. In order to save money, most financial comitments had to done optionally subject to the Parliaments approval, with effect from Friday April 15th at the earliest date.

2.4.2 Schedule
The project schedule called for a 14 days mobilization of uprighting contractors organization including site offices and all back up facilities required to start the work. The restraint on financing put a restraint on mobilization. Although site office space, quarters, office equipoment, phones, fax etc. could be planned for and ordered optionally, mobilization of the facilities could not be affected before after Parliaments approval of the expenditure. The same was even more applicable to expensive floating equipment, barges. Mobilization on site in Stavanger commenced accordingly from Friday April 15th with personnel moving into the site office from Monday April 18th and the following week. Taking Easter Holliday which ended on April 4th 1983 into account mobilization commenced according to schedule.

2.4.2 Manning - project organization
Manning and mobilization of of SNSC project organization proved to be CRITICAL. As Main Contractors Representative Mr. Ostlund was in accordance with the terms of the contract,( ref. Conditions of Contract, Scope of Work clause 1.2c) instructed to "In the case of sudden, unforeseen or irregular events or development that require immediate action, the Main Contractor's Representative shall take such actions that he judges is best to safeguard personnel. vesels and equipment and to secure the successful result of the operation." In accordance with article 2.3 of the Articles of Agreement, Annex A: Scope of Work was given presedence above Annex F: Coordination Procedures. As such Mr. Ostlund acted in good faith in accordance with the contract when he contacted outside personnel for recruitment.

The day before receipt of Letter of Intent Mr. Ostlund visited Stolt Nielsens office in Oslo in order to familiarize himself with the status on the project as it was obviously to the people involved only a matter of formality before SNSC was announced as the elected uprighting contractor. Details from Mr. Ostlund's metings with SNSC personnel in Oslo on March 29th (before Easter) and his following actions as Main Contractors Representative are divulged in his book "Sabotasjen mot Kielland" (The Sabotage against Kielland) published in 1992.

As documented in the book, SNSC's project organization at the time of Contract Award was a false play. The presented organization chart did not comply with the requirements of the Contract nor NS 5801. It further proved that majority of listed key personnel were not available for the project. They were occupied on other work, not employed nor contracted for the uprighting operation. As such only 3 of the listed 12 key persons in the bid were available for the project at start up including Mr. Ostlund himself. Deputy Operations Manager Bill Forsythe was on leave and others had left the Company. The situation was CRITICAL and called for immediate action. How could SNSC and KE as Project Managers Representative let this situation happen? This proved for either incompetence or negligence. Mr. Ostlund managed within the short time he was on the project to correct the manning situation and avoid a critical situation to develope into a catastrope, thanks to good help from many of his contacts within the industry at that time. Professionals are normally not available at hand on a few days notice.

2.4.3 Engineering
Another matter who proved to be a restraint was engineering. Fixings of the buoyancy tanks to the rig had to be altered as result of the last diving inspecton of the rig, and the tanks had to secured against rotation during uprighting. The ballast procedures given from KE and their engineering consultant Bergen Enginering (BE) was revised causing alterations in fixings of valves and instrumentation. Redesign continued after Contract Award. April 5th 1983, was the first day after Easter Holliday. Mr. Ostlund met with Mr E. Martinussen who was working as senior project engineer in charge of SNSC's engineering activities on the project and technical coordination with KE/BE. Mr. Ostlund asked Mr. Martinussen about the Status of Certifying Agency (DnV)'s Approval of the uprighting procedure, as this was basic input for the detailed enginering work performed within SNSC. Mr. Martinussen hesitated and responded that the Status on Approval was KE's problem, and he as senior project engineer for SNSC responded to the information he received from KE/BE. Mr. Martinussens supervisor within SNSC, was the former Brown and Root (B&R) employee Dave Jordan, now acting as Technical Manager within SNSC in Oslo.

Approval was important but so was manning. The field operations was not to start before after the Parliaments approval and site Mobilization. 3 days later on Friday April 8th Mr. Ostlund makes a phonecall to Project Managers Representative (KE) Mr. Kåre Storvik asking to be informed about the status on DnV approval in order to commence planning of start up of work items and mobilization of floating equipment. The task of making a spread chart of floating equipment was given to Mr. Alan Whittaker who had been introduded as planner on the project team by Dave Jordan. (This showed to be the same Mr Alan Wittaker who was involved in SD-Marine and the unsucessful uprighting attempt in 1980)

Contract Scope of Work, page 28, clause 9.11. Certifying Agent and Independent Controlling Authority , quote:" Main Contractor shall obtain approval of all his calculations, procedures and drawings from Det norske Veritas through Project Manager prior to the commencement of the relevant Work Items.".
It was imperative for the quality of SNSC 's detailed engineering work to know the status on DnV approval of the overall uprighting method and procedure. How could DnV approve detailed engineering work unless the overall method was approved? And how could SNSC defend spending money on mobilizing costly floating equipment without knowing DnV's status on the overall approval of the uprighting method, including size of buoyancy tanks, and anchoring system. Several work items were fixed price packages and there was a large possibility of loosing money having floating equipment on daily rates on stand by.

Mr. Kåre Storvik as Project Managers representative was not able to give an answer to the status on DnV overall approval of the uprighting method. He was going to investigate the matter and Mr. Ostlund made an agreement to meet with him in Trondheim the comming Tuesday, April 12th in order to discuss the matter and how to proceed on the project. On Monday morning April 11th Mr. Ostlund was informed at SNSC's office in Oslo that Mr. Storvik had cancelled their appointment, without suggesting any new time for a meeting. Mr. Ostlund tried in vain to get hold of Mr. Storvik the whole day. He was told by Mr. Storviks staf in Trondheim that Storvik had left for Oslo. Nowone within KE in Trondheim could tell the status on DnV approval. This had now become a CRITICAL matter.

Mr. Ostlund struggled for his remaining time on the project to get knowledge about the Status on Approval. It became obvious to him as he moved on taking actions he judged best in order to secure a successful result of the operation, technical, safety wise and ecconomical, that Approval must likely was not in hand. However, people in responsible positions within KE, DnV and others must have known this How come no-one including Project Managers Representative Kåre Storvik did not inform Mr. Ostlund about the situation.

A lot of aggrevation could have been avoided. Even peoplel Mr. Ostlund introduced to the project team as f.i. Mr Harald Drager, a long time former employee of DnV and Employee elected Representative on DnV's Board, did not manage to get any information about the Approval status. In the mean time Mr. Bill Forsythe returned from his absence on Monday April 11th and put pressure on mobilization of floating equipment and divers in order to start work on the rig in Gandsfjorden. Dragging equipment into Gandsfjorden at this early time would have caused caos. The back up organization on site and at SNSC's operational office in Haugesund was neither prepared. Forsythe pressed on taking the support barge Nutech Fjordbase into Gandsfjorden. Mr. Ostlund ordere inspection of the vessel to take place at Haugesund before taking it to Stavanger. The inspection resulted that several modificationshad to be done, among ohers installation of adequate sanitary facilities for the accomodation of the working crew. These modifications was lot easier to cope with by the SNSC staff in Haugesund in stead of by the project team on site in Gandsfjorden.

In order to straighten out the situation and prepare for corrective actions to take place Mr Ostlund called for a Design Review. Offer for engineering support was obtained from company Arne R. Reinertsen in Trondheim, who had competent engineers familiar with "Kielland". An order for Design Review was placed with Arne R. Reinertsen on Thursday April 21st. On April 22nd Mr. Ostlund had made an appointment with the projects senior engieneer Mr. Martinussen to meet in SNSC's office in Oslo at 11.00 hrs for status review on the inhouse detaile engineering work.
Design Review - order of 21.04.83
Offer from Arne Reinertsen page 1 and page 2.

In the morning on Friday April 22nd Mr Ostlund had an appointment with Admiral Tiltnes in his office in the Military Head Quarter at Huseby in Oslo. Matter of discusion was the appointment of Admiral Tiltnes as Maritim Expert on the project.

At noon the same day Mr. Ostlund entering SNSC s office in Oslo was fired as Main Contractor Representative. The person mainly advocating for Mr. Ostlunds dismissal from the project was the former B&R employee and Technical Manager of SNSC Dave Jordan. In general the dismissal must have been accepted by KE, as in accordance with Contract terms Main Contractor could not move personnel from the project without Project Managers acceptance.

During the weekend and following day Mr. Ostlund received telexes from the Design Review performed by Arne R. Reinertsen, which substantiated that the uprighting procedure developed further by KE/BE included severall serious uncertainties which had to be looked into. Anchoring system, drainage, even the computer model for calculatons of forces on the rig during uprighting was incorrect. This introduced uncertainties in regard to the design and size of the buoyancy tanks. Further the weight and position of center of gravity and center of buoyancy was not defind, and Reinertsen called for an analysis to cope with this matter, taking the worse possible case into account.
RGP telex of 25.04.83 page 1 and 25.04.83 page 2
RGP telex of 26.04.83 page 1 and 26.04.83 page 2

Mr. Ostlund copied the telexes with the findings from Reinertsen to SNSC in Oslo with his recommendation for how to proceed. Mr. Ostlund had on April 15th (day after Parliament approval) instructed his contract engineer on the project,to send a preliminary request to KE for a Variation Order due to alterations on the Project taken place since Contract award. Such variation to include cost for increased project engienering work and planning.

The meeting Mr Ostlund had agreed with KE should have taken place on Monday/Tuesday April 25/26th 1983 in Stavanger due discuss and agree on project matters including a revised project schedule was postpone. In stead SNSC and KE had a contractual meeting in Oslo. Managing Director Frithjof Skouverøe told Mr. Ostlund on the phone that KE had agreed to an increase in Contract payment to the satisfactory of SNSC. Technical matters were not discussed.
OCO telex to SNSC of 27.04.83 page 1 and 27.04.83 page 3 and 27.04.83 page 4.
OCO telex to SNSC of 28.04.83 page 1 and 28.04.83 page 2

Mr. Ostlund was contacted by the Kielland Foundation who was concerned about the outcome of the second uprighting attempt. Mr. Ostlund informed their leader Mr. Reme who had lost his brother in the diaster about the situation. Mr. Reme was a student priest in Stavnager, and his brother was one of two American citizens who perished in the catastrophe. During a discussion on Mr. Reme's office on May 6th 1983, Reme informed that the Foundation just recently had received a copy of the documents presented before the Parliament on April 14th 1983. It was quite a package. Mr. Ostlund questioned that something must be in the package about DnV approval. Correctly in the back part of the document pile was a letter from DnV to the Department of Trade dated April 12th.1983 A copy of the letter was sent KE, ref: letter HD page 1 and letter HD page 2.

On page 2, in their letter of April 12th 1983, DnV clearly states that they would not recommend uprighting unless satisfactory solutions are being found. Further that they as a preliminary conclussion do not find the uprighting method satisfactory documented for a safe operation. In other words NOT APPROVED !

How come KE, Kåre Storvik receiving a copy of this letter did not immediately inform Main Contractors Representative Ole Ostlund, so they together could plan the proper action to take place?

How come the Parliament in their session on April 14th 1983 could decide on granting financing to a by the Certifying Authority non approved operation? Was this information put forward to the Minister responsible for presenting the case to the Parliament? What did the opposition in the Parliament know? What would the political situation be if the uprighting did not succeed? Would such a situation call for change in Government?`

Rogalands Avis had on Friday, May 20th 1983 an intervju with the War II Milorg resistance fighter and Parliament member from the Labour Party, Mr. Alf Bjorno. Mr. Bjorno stated that if the uprighting of "Kielland" becomes a failure it would call for a Government crises. RA 20 mai 1983

Pressure on KE, BE and SNSC to make the required technical alterations was applied during summer 1983. Uprighting was at Contract Award scheduled to take place in mid June 1983. In their progress report per April 15th which was released after April 25th uprighting is scheduled to take place one month later on July 21st. The incompleteness of the design caused further delays and increased expenditure which threathened a succesful result as weather window came closer and budget overrun increased. The final brake through came when Mr. Ostlund made contact with H.M.King Olav V. Mr. Ostlund met the King at Hankø in the Oslofjord during the Eight Metre World Cup sailing in late July. Back in his Stavanger office Mr. Ostlund wrote a letter to the King and was given the honor of meeting the King at the Royal Castle in Oslo on August 29th 1983.

During this period of time changes were applied to the anchoring system, and recalculations of the uprighting procedure as performed. The latter resulted in that the buoyancy tanks had to be increased, alternatively that the safety requirement of 800-900 tons damage stability was compromised during the most critical phase, as new calculations proved that the rig had to be uprighted lower in the water. The decision was made to compromise the safety requirement and damage stability was reduced to 400 tonn. The safety requirement of 800-900 tons damage stability was at contract award an ultimate requirement and would under other circumstances have caused the operation to be stopped. Due to lobbying and Mr Ostlund's meting with King Olav in end August, the prestige of everyone involved, KE, BE, SNSC, DnV, was at stake. The Government made an additional allowance of 50 mill kr.

On September 28th 1983 Stavanger Aftenblad had a one page advert from KE with dates from the uprighting operation. On August 15th two Smit Tak International barges are contracted two support the rig from sideways rotation. This could have been avoided by following the recommendation from Reinertsen of having an angle in the achoring system in stead of parallell wires. On September 11th the advert confirms that damage stability (in Norwegian "reserveoppdrift") is lowered to 400 tonn. By doing the checking Reinertsen and also Mr. Gunnar Ros suggested on weight and stability of the rig the reserve buoyancy could easily have been added in good time keeping up with the safety requirement. Such increase in reserve buoyancy could for instance have been accomplished by adding transverse loacated tank compartment on top of the buoyancy tanks. Such it would have been posible to upright the rig at an earlier date, and at less expenditure. KE advert in Stavanger Aftenblad 28.09.1983

As one lawyer expressed when discussing with Mr. Ostlund the breach of contract by SNSC: "You have been fired for trying to save the Government 1 mill kr per day" .